ABSTRACT In practice, many brand products retailers have adopted mixed bundling (MB) and reserved product pricing (RPP) in response to external competition, such as supplier's encroachment. There is scanty literature which addresses such flexibility among retailers and its impact on a dual-channel supply chain. To fill this void, we considered a two-period dual-channel model in which one of the two manufacturers sells a product through a direct channel; and through an independent retailer who can bundle two manufacturers' products together (Model M) and reduce their reservation prices (Model R). Our central result demonstrates that, although both MB and RPP strategies can indeed improve retailer's profitability, MB strategy creates strategic issues that are significantly different from that of RPP strategy. More specifically, relative to MB strategy, the retailer's RPP strategy is always detrimental to the manufacturer. Finally, to avoid the retailer's strategic choice for RPP, we designed a revenue sharing contract which can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain ecosystem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet and third-party logistics platforms enable manufacturers to easily compete with retailers for the loyalty of consumers by selling products directly for many years. This is often referred to as ''supplier encroachment'' [1] . For example, within the computing ecosystem, many brand products manufacturers, including IBM, HP, Epson, and Lenovo, have adopted dual channels to market their products. In fact, this tendency can be observed in a variety of industries, such as Burberry (in apparel), Estee Lauder (in cosmetics), Cisco System (in electronics and appliances), Pandora (in jewellery) and Audi (in automobile).
There is no doubt that supplier's encroachment has a negative impact on the very fragile cooperative relationships between the manufacturer and the traditional retailer.
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In a survey of 50 manufacturers, 66% indicated that channel conflict was the biggest issue they faced in their online sales strategy. It was three times as many as the second most frequent response [2] . For example, in the case of HP's direct selling (in fact, HP chooses to sell directly only to its 1,000 largest accounts and leaves the large accounts to the retailers), mid-market and corporate resellers have voiced their frustrations with about management of HP -''the fact that HP is aggressively going after direct sales does not help anybody'' -Simon Aron, the joint managing director at Eurodata Systems [3] lamented. Another extreme case comes from Bass Ale. When Bass Ale launched a home delivery program, the supplier's top distributor retaliated by pulling all Bass products off its shelves [4] . Similarly, in 1999, Home Depot issued a Godfatheresque directive to more than 1,000 suppliers asking them to stop encroachment activities, otherwise, it will be selective with regard to the vendors to be selected for Brookerage [5] . This allusion, [6] has used the parable of the VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ''boiling frog'' to illustrate that the manufacturer will ''boil'' the traditional retailer who adheres to a more convenient direct-based distribution channel. Although many remedies of such channel conflicts have been proposed in research, however, they ignored the possibility of countermeasures. That is the retailer may response to the supplier's encroachment whiles retaining the market share. In practice, retailers naturally take various measures to response to external competition. For example, in 2004, to deal with rivalry from cable companies, Cox Communications Inc. started providing steep discounts to consumers who purchased phone, cable, and broadband Internet services as a mixed bundling (MB thereafter). Firms can benefit from these deals ''because customers who sign up for packages defect to competing services at about half the rate of basic cable customers'' -Cox's vice president of product marketing and management [7] . Similarly, to deal with external competition and to keep the existing market share, Conrad (one of the brand names of German electronics retails supplying products ranging from basic electronic components to PCs) usually bundles the products of low-end electric guitars and low-end amplifiers from independent suppliers on the its website at discounted prices [8] . MB is a marketing strategy that sells two or more products jointly at a discounted price. It is mostly used in airlines, online games, online media, digital content, online financial services and other marketing platforms [9] . In a mixed bundling scheme, customers can either buy products separately or in a bundled form. In fact, besides the MB strategies, product reserved prices 1 (RPP hereafter) is also a very powerful weapon available to retailers to boost sales/profits and also to deal with competition from the market [10] . For instance, Giant Eagle, a dominant grocery chain in the Pittsburgh (PA metropolitan area) started the ''fuelperks!'' program under which a consumer upon purchasing a total of $50 of groceries earns 10c / off per gallon of gasoline purchased from GetGo at the subsequent purchase. The RPP strategy of ''fuelperks!'' has been a tremendous promotional strategy and as a result has led to a significant increase in sales/ profits for the Giant Eagle-GetGo duo [11] .
Although, MB and/or RPP strategies have been studied extensively (see §2 for a detailed review), little attention has been paid to how retailers' choice on the two strategies affects supply chain performance. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there is no literature addressing the economic impact relative to the two strategies (i.e., the MB and RPP dual-channel supply chain). Both MB and RPP are appealing to retailers owing to the fact that consumers' valuations have less dispersion than the valuations of component products [12] . In essence, they work in distinct ways [11] : MB usually involves two products bundled together and such 1 That is, the seller holds the discount on product offerings in reserve so that the segment buying both products at the initial price cannot avail of the discount. The scenario is called reserved product pricing Prasad, A., R. Venkatesh and V. Mahajan (2015) . ''Product bundling or reserved product pricing? Price discrimination with myopic and strategic consumers.'' International Journal of Research in Marketing 32(1): 1-8. tie-in effect helps to transfer consumer surplus from one product to the other and benefits the seller through demand gains [13] . RPP, however, means that a seller offering two bundle of products, sets their initial prices, then observes the purchasing behavior of alternative segments, and accordingly, offers discounts to segment those who purchased one product without the other at the initial stage. That is, the seller holds the discount on product offerings in reserve so that the segmented market buying both products at the initial price cannot access the discount.
In the present study, we try to highlight the issue of how retailer's MB and RPP strategies in the traditional retail channels affect the supply chain economic performance of the supplier's encroachment. That is, we develop a dualchannel supply chain model where one of the two suppliers encroaches into the retail market by operating a manufactured-owned channel, but the retailer is flexible to choose two differentiated response strategies (MB and/or RPP, for such supplier encroachment). More specifically, using these models, we sought to address the issues that a manufacturer has to focus on all the supply chain economic performance as his retailer's strategic response to supplier encroachment as follows: how do retailers' different response strategies to supplier encroachment affect all parties' profitability? Which strategy is better for the manufacturer, the retailer and the total industry? Finally, as a Stackelberg leader, is there any effective method for the manufacturer that can not only provide revenues to both himself/herself and the retailer directly but can also positively affect the total supply chain?
The central result we obtained showed that, although both MB and RPP strategies can indeed improve retailer's profitability, for economic performance of supply chain, MB strategies create strategic outcomes that are significantly different from that of RPP strategies. More specifically, relative to the MB strategy, the retailer's RPP strategy is always detrimental to the manufacturer. Finally, to avoid the retailer's strategic choice of RPP, we designed a revenue sharing contract to achieve a ''win-win-win'' result for both parties and the total supply chain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the related literature and explains our contributions in more detail. Section III describes both models and analyzes optimal decisions. Section IV examines both models and presents the main results. In section V, we present the numerical further analysis of our results. Lastly, section VI provides managerial implications and future research directions of the study.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to the stream of studies on supply chain conflict and coordination. In particular, Tsay and Agrawal [14] examined ways to adjust the manufacturerreseller relationship that have been observed in industry and found that revisiting the wholesale pricing terms can improve the overall efficiency of a dual-channel system. Cai [15] investigated the influence of channel structures and channel coordination among the supplier, retailer, and the entire supply chain, and as a result suggested that the preference lists of the supplier and the retailer over channel structures with or without coordination are different. Subsequently, Xu et al. [16] proposed a two-way revenue sharing contract by coordinating the dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse; and they analyzed how the attitude towards risk changes the parameters of the coordinating contract. Recently, Saha et al. [17] used a two-way price discount mechanism to coordinate the dual-channel conflict in a three-echelon supply chain. We refer the interested reader to Xu et al. [16] , Amrouche and Yan [18] and Zhang and Wang [19] for a complete literature review on the effects of production and transportation coordination on supply chain. As mentioned earlier, although many remedies for the channel conflict have been proposed from economic performance perspective, extant researches ignored the possibility of retailers taking countermeasures as a response to supplier encroachment, whiles retaining the existing market share. In contrast to above streams of studies, our models, aside focusing on strategic considerations for the overall efficiency of a dual-channel system, also accommodate for retailer flexibility in choosing different responses of supplier's encroachment.
Our work is also related to the body of studies on competition between the manufacturer and the retailer in a dual-channel supply chain. For example, a prior study by Hahn et al. [20] examined competition in a multiple-channel environment and analyzed the use of market coverage as a lever to control it. Later, Chiang et al. [1] showed that both the manufacturer and the retailer can be better off after the manufacturer enters the direct channel. Recently, Arya et al. [21] , Li et al. [22] and Yan et al. [23] focused on supplier encroachment. How the competition between the manufacturer and the retailer affects the dual-channel supply chain has been well studied, but there has been little attention paid to the possibility of retailers taking countermeasures in response to the supplier encroachment whiles keeping the existing market share. A few studies, including Yan and Pei [24] and Li and Li [25] , have recently begun exploring the response strategies of retailers on suppliers' encroachment, and little attention has been paid to the fact that retailers, especially those dominant ones, can respond to suppliers' encroachment; whiles retaining its selling advantage by adopting various promotional strategies such as product bundling and reserved product price. However, there is a knowledge gap with respective to how a retailer's MB and RPP strategies can impact on a dual-channel supply chain in extant literature.
The third related stream of literature is Stackelberg games. Stackelberg games is a sequential decision-making problem involving leader's initial movement, and subsequent movements by followers [26] , -mostly used in supply chain management. Based on the leadership structure, a significant amount of research has been conducted on Stackelberg games within the realms of supply chain management, with manufacturers as the dominant leaders and retailers as the followers [27] . Recently, a score of studies have applied Stackelberg games in dual-channel supply chain (see: [21] ; [15] ; [28] ), especially, in dual-channel competition. For example, Cai et al. [29] evaluated how price discount contracts and pricing schemes affect dual-channel supply chain competition. From the supplier-Stackelberg, retailerStackelberg, and Nash game theoretical perspectives, they showed that the price discount contracts outperform the noncontract scenarios in reducing the channel conflicts. Chen et al. [30] investigated dual-channel pricing strategies in a manufacturer Stackelberg supply chain. They found that the manufacturer's wholesale price contract can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Rahmani and Yavari [31] proposed a Stackelberg game approach to investigate the demand disruption management in a dual-channel supply chain. In our current model, we consider the Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower.
The fourth related stream of literature is on product bundling and product reservation pricing. On one hand, our paper is related to the rich literature on product bundling. Prior studies espoused that product bunding has proved to be an effective tool for price discrimination for monopolists (e.g. [13] and [32] ). Some research also addressed the product bundling issue in a duopoly market (e.g. [33] and [34] ). Thus, research that mainly concentrate on the theoretical properties, and the optimal price of product bundling are abound in literature. (e.g. [35] - [37] ). Empirical research on consumer's perception of bundling is also a hot topic in this field (see: [38] , [39] ). Recent studies, however, explored the optimality of pure and mixed bundling numerically, in a more complex and in a realistic approach ( [36] and [40] ). On the other hand, product reservation pricing is widely used in market research as a cut off strategy. Especially, the relationship between product bundling and product reservation pricing has been analyzed in studies. This is due to the fact that reservation pricing may affect the profitability of product bundling strategies. For example, Sarkar and Lee [41] described a twoechelon supply chain model to analyze the optimal pricing strategy for complementary products with reservation pricing, and in the process bundled two complementary products for sale. Song and Li [42] investigated the optimal unbundling pricing policy when a firm dynamically prices a basic service, while separating the sale of a fixed-price add-on with respect to the degree of dependence between consumers' reservation prices for the basic service and addon in the service industries by considering the product reservation price and compared it with the bundling model. Again, Kopczewski et al. [9] presented a model to show how consumer's reservation prices affect the profitability of three different product pricing strategies: pure components, pure bundling, and mixed bundling. Their results showed that the pricing strategies largely depend on the particular type of reservation pricing mechanism for the substitutability and complementarity of goods. However, there is no study on the MB and PRR as independent strategies used by retailers to VOLUME 7, 2019 response to supplier encroachment to the best of our knowledge in extant literature.
The last related stream of literature is on the strategies of MB and RPP to serve as effective tools for retailers to deal with market competition. For example, Stigler [12] , Ghosh and Balachander [34] , Surti and Hassini [43] and Cao and Geng [44] analyzed different bundling scenarios used as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the upstream manufacturer in the form of lower wholesale price. In particular, our retailer results are consistent with prior work on cross-market discounts, such as Dhar and Raju [45] , Goic et al. [11] and Gilbride et al. [46] , where every consumer who buys one product is eligible for a discount couponreward miles or a price cut towards the purchase of another product. It should be noted that our model focuses on the competition between the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer, rather than the competition between two retailers. Although, the development of RPP is motivated by markdown pricing (e.g., [47] and [48] ), our conceptualization of RPP complements extant research by considering a multiproduct setting in which the seller blends inter-temporal pricing and cross selling. In our RPP models, consumers cannot get lower price by waiting. That is, getting the discount requires the consumer to buy priced product regularly, and secondly, one of the two products is assuredly sold at the regular price. In summary, as noted before MB and/or RPP have been studied extensively, however, little attention has been paid to how retailers' choice of the two strategies impacts on economic performance against the backdrop of supplier encroachment.
Our paper differs from extant literature in two ways. Firstly, rather than focusing on the efforts from the perspective of manufacturers in dual-channel coordination, we considered retailers to have the potential flexibility to take some countermeasures in order to response to supplier's encroachment. Secondly, although the MB strategy and the RPP strategy have been studied extensively in literature, little is known about how MB and PRR as independent strategies are used by retailers to response to supplier encroachment in a dualchannel supply chain economic performance setting. Therefore, in the present study, we filled this gap by highlighting on the issue of how retailer's MB and RPP strategies in the traditional retail channels affect the supply chain members' economic performance, ostensibly, as a result of supplier encroachment.
III. MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION

A. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Our models considered a two-period dual-channel supply chain model in which two manufacturers (i.e., manufacturer A and manufacturer B) offer two categories of products (i.e., product A and product B) 2 to a common retailer who 2 Product A is solely produced by manufacturer A and product B is solely provided by manufacturer B. Product A and product B are neither complementary nor substitutive, but two completely different products. can bundle two component products together (see, Fig. 1 , Model M); or provides a reserved product prices (Model R) as a response strategy to supplier encroachment, in Period 2. The two-period model is driven by the different market strategies we considered. To highlight supplier's encroachment without loss of generality, we assumed manufacturer A can open its own direct channel and distribute products through the traditional retail channel as well as the direct channel in Period 2. That is, the retailer has a monopolistic position on the market in Period 1. Drawing upon the initial works of [21] and [23] , in order to emphasis on marketing issues, we normalized both manufacturers' marginal costs of production to zero. To reflect the fact that the retailer has an advantage in marketing activities, we assumed that the unit cost of selling a product via the retailer is c r = 0, however, it becomes c d = c > 0 [21] , [24] and [23] ), when it is sold via the manufacturer's direct channel.
We further assumed that no consumer can use more than one unit of the product in two periods and that their valuations for each product are distributed uniformly on [0,1] [10] . Following [10] and [49] , [50] , we found that component goods' demands are D i(p) = 1 − p i , where i = A, B represent the size of the potential market of the product from manufacturer i.
In both models, all players have access to the same information and could anticipate that the supplier encroachment would rise in Period 2. The decision sequence of the two models is as follows: Firstly, manufacturer A and manufacturer B set the wholesale price w k 1A and w k B in the first-period; Secondly, the retailer determines the optimal price of product A and product B p k i in the first-period. Then, the manufacturer A simultaneously determines the optimal q k m and w k 2A in the second-period; Finally, the retailer sets the optimal d k in the second-period.
Following Shang and Yang [51] , we set a consistent pricing scheme in the dual-channel supply chain. That is, we assumed that the price of product A sold in manufacturer A's direct channel is identical to that of the retailer's channel. (i.e., p A = p m ). Consistent pricing schemes are widely used in practice. To avoid channel conflicts, a lot of enterprises tend to set consistent prices in both online and offline channels. For example, the 11-inch iPad Pro sells for RMB 6331 on Apple's official website in April 2019 (www.apple.com/cn). The product is sold at the same price in bricks-and-mortar stores as well.
B. MIXED BUNDLING SETTING (MODEL M) 3
In this subsection, we considered the retailer's response strategies to supplier's encroachment with mixed bundling.
Under this setting, there are two possibilities for selling product A and product B: (i) If consumers buy both products, the retailer gives a discount d M for product A; (ii) If consumers buy any one of the two products, they should pay regular prices.
To capture consumers who differ in their willingness to pay, we assumed the relative heterogeneity of consumers' utility from the product consumption (characterized by θ ∈ [0, 1], and it is distributed uniformly as 1 × 1 square. Following the initial works of, Mcafee et al. [32] and Venkatesh and Kamakura [52] , we assumed that a consumer has a valuation of θ for a product, which is heterogeneous and uniformly distributed over [0, 1] , as opined by [11] and [10] . We thus, derived the demand functions from the consumer utility functions as follows 4 :
where the subscript 2A(d)(2A(n)) denotes the units of product A sold by the retailer at a discounted (regular) price with both products (product A only) in Period 2. The subscript 2B denotes the demand for product B in Period 2. Also, the subscript 1A (1B) denotes the demand for products A (B) in Period 1. We then used backward induction to determine the subgame perfect equilibrium.
1) SECOND-PERIOD ANALYSIS
In Period 2, the retailer's problem is to choose an optimal discount (d) for profit maximization. The inverse demand function for goods in Period 2 is given by Eq.(1). We used the lowercase π k rj (uppercase π k mj ) 5 to represent the profit of the retailer (manufacturer) in period j under Model k.Under Model M, the retailer's profit in Period 2 was expressed as:
Here, the first term represents the retailer's revenue from selling product A at discount price; the second term represents the retailer's revenue from selling product A at regular price; and the last term represents the retailer's revenue from selling product B.
In anticipating the retailer's reactions in Eq. (2), manufacturer A's problem was expressed as:
where the first term represents manufacturer A's revenue from wholesaling product A; and the second term represents manufacturer A's revenue from the direct sale of product A.
2) FIRST-PERIOD ANALYSIS
Given the optimal solution for the second-period problem, we now look at both parties' first-period policies. In Period 1, the retailer's objective is to maximize his/her total two-period
Therefore, the retailer's problem in Period 1 can be expressed as:
Here, the first two terms represent the retailer's revenue from selling product A and product B in Period 1 respectively, and the last term represents the retailer's revenue from Period 2.
With anticipation for the retailer's reactions in Eq.(4), the manufacturer's problem was expressed as follows:
By using backwards induction and derivations from MATLAB (2016), we obtained the corresponding equilibrium decisions and profits as demonstrated in 
C. RESERVED PRODUCT PRICES SETTING (MODEL R)
We subsequently analyzed Model R, where the retailer adopts RPP strategy in response to supplier's encroachment. In Model R, the retailer holds the coupon on product offerings in reserve so that the market segment buying both products at the initial price cannot access the coupon. More specifically, in this subsection, the retailer who is offering two products, sets their initial prices in Period 1, observes the 6 For clarity, all proofs are provided in the appendix.
supplier's encroachment behavior of M1 and, accordingly, offers coupon to consumers who purchased one product from manufacturer A in Period 2.
All consumers are strategic (i.e., forward looking) and thus, anticipate the fact that those consumers who buy product B in Period 1, would get a coupon for product A and may use it in Period 2. Consequently, in Period 1, the demand for product A and B were given as (1 − p R A ) and
. Because the number of units sold through the direct-channel was q R m , the demand for product A with a regular price was given as [ 
1) SECOND-PERIOD ANALYSIS
In Period 2, the retailer's problem is to choose optimal discount (d) for the coupon to maximize profit. Therefore, under Model R, the retailer's problem in stage 2 was given by:
Here, the first term represents the retailer's revenue from selling product A at discount price. The second term represents the retailer's revenue from selling product A at regular price; and the last term represents the retailer's revenue from selling product B.
In anticipating the retailer's response to the wholesale price (S)he sets, the manufacturer chooses q R m and w R 2A to maximize his profit; that is,
The first two terms in eqn. (7) represent manufacturer A's revenue from wholesaling product A; and the last term represents manufacturer A's revenue from direct sales of product A.
2) FIRST-PERIOD ANALYSIS
Given the optimal solution in Period 2, we now consider both parties' problems in Period 2. In Period 1, the retailer's objective is to maximize profit at the two periods −π R r = π R r1 +π R r2 . and the retailer's problem in Period 1 was given as: max
Subsequently, the manufacturer's problem was expressed as follows:
Solving the retailer's optimal price from (8) and then substituting it into eqn. (9) gives the equilibrium wholesale price in Period 1. All equilibrium decisions and profits for Model R are listed in Table 2 .
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we firstly analysed the difference in optimal decisions between the two models and subsequently, broaden our analysis to encapsulate the difference in economic performance between the two models. Finally, a revenue sharing contract is proposed. This strategy allows us to address the questions posed at the beginning of this paper.
A. COMPARISION OF OPTIMAL OUTCOMES
We first derived some interesting insights from the difference in levels of supplier encroachment. Based on the outcomes in Table 1 , we deduced the following observations:
The manufacturer is more likely to encroach further into the retail market in Model M than Model R, that is, q M m > q R m . Proposition 1 revealed that, compared to Model R, the manufacturer always sells more quantities of product through direct-channel. That is, q M m > q R m , recalling that, in essence, MB and RPP work in distinct ways. More specifically, under the MB strategy, two products are bundled together and its tie-in effects help to transfer consumer surplus from one product to the other. This benefits the seller through demand gains. Conversely, under the strategy of RPP, the retailer would offer two products, set their initial prices, and observe the purchasing behavior of alternative market segments. Discounts are accordingly offered in market segments which purchased one product but not the other in the initial stage. In other words, in both of our models, the anticipation of supplier' encroachment in Period 2 means the retailer would adopt MB in period two. However, in Model R, the retailer would offer discounts to segments which purchased product B in Period 1. That is, unlike Model M, in Model R, the retailer can lock in consumers who purchased product B in Period 1. Thus, Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: because in Model R the retailer can lock consumers who purchased product B in Period 1, the manufacturer's potential market in Period 2 will be smaller than Model M. As a result, the manufacturer will have to sell less units through his direct-channel in Model R. That is, q M m > q R m . In the dual-channel supply chain system, the manufacturer's profits come from two sources: selling products through the e-channel and through product wholesaling (i.e., the traditional channel [49] . As Proposition 1 has shown, the manufacturer always sells more products in Model M. This begs for the question, what is the difference in the wholesale prices that the manufacturer sets in the two models? We summarized our findings in the following proposition: Proposition 1 shows that, relative to Model R, the manufacturer always sells more quantities of the product through the direct-channel. That is, q M m > q R m . Proposition 2, further indicates that, in Period 2, besides encroaching further into the retail market in Model M more than Model R, the manufacturer usually sets a higher wholesale price in Model M more than Model R. Possible explanations for this observation are as follows. Under Model M, manufacturer A anticipates that the retailer may adopt the MB strategy to response to his encroachment. This may hinder direct channel sales. As a result, the manufacturer has the incentive to raise the wholesale price. Under Model R, the retailer can lock consumers into a strategy that causes the manufacturer's potential market in Period 2, to be smaller than that of Model M -which obtains more potential markets and limits competition from the retail channel. The manufacturer, therefore, increases the wholesale price to reduce the retailer's units in Period 1 and Period 2.
In response to supplier encroachment and the strategies in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the retailer usually sets a higher price for consumers in Period 1 but a higher discount in Period 2. The following proposition summarizes our key finding.
Proposition 3: In Period 1, the retailer always provides a higher price in Model M relative Model R. That is, p M A > p R A ; in Period 2. The opposite is also true.
Recall that in our two models, the manufacturer encroaches upon the retail market in Period 2. As a result, the retailer has a monopolistic position on the market in Period 1. Hence, Proposition 3 demonstrates that, when confronted with a more serious supplier encroachment in Period 2, in order to ''compensate'' for profit ''loss'' in Period 2, the retailer usually sets a higher price for consumers in Period 1. On the other hand, the retailer would offer a higher discount in Period 2 -a strategy which makes the marginal revenue in the direct channel lower and limits competition from the direct-channel.
B. COMPARISION OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
In this subsection, we mainly focus on economic performance from two perspectives. More specifically, we endeavored to highlight the following three questions relative to retailers' different response strategies in our two models: Which is better for the total supply chain performance? Which is better for the manufacturer and the retailer? Is it well supported by all parties? We first address the difference in manufacturer's profitability between both models.
Proposition 4: The retail's MB strategy is always beneficial for the manufacturer, that is, π M
m > π R m . Proposition 1, and Proposition 2, show that the manufacturer always adopts more aggressive strategies in Model M. For example, setting higher wholesale prices in Period 2 and selling more units in the direct channel. Proposition 4, further indicates that the manufacturer would benefit more from a retailer's response strategy of MB relative to RPP. The intuition for Proposition 4, is analyzed in Proposition 1, and 2 and is not repeated here.
We now address the difference in a retailer's profitability between the two models.
Proposition 5: to adopt RPP strategy to response to supplier's encroachment relative to MB strategy. That is, π M r < π R r . It is worthy to note that, in each of our two models, the two parties are independent players and as such, seek to maximize their respective profits independently. On the other hand, the manufacturer in both models serves as a Stackelberg leader, who would encroach upon the retail market through direct selling. Consequently, the retailer's demand for the wholesale product becomes more sensitive to the wholesale price in Model M, unlike in Model R, where the retailer can lock some segment in Period 2, by offering discounts in Period 1, in Model M. A more detailed intuition for Proposition 5 is analyzed in Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4, and is not repeated here.
With regard to supply chain performance (i.e.,
, we are able to summarize the following key difference between the two models based on Propositions 4 and 5 in the following proposition;
Proposition 6: The industry profit in Model M is always higher relative to Model R when
A retailer's MB strategy can enhance the industry profit more than her RPP strategy, even when her profitability is lower than Model R. When the manufacturer encroaches upon the retail market, such encroachment can avoid the double marginalization problem 7 when (s)he sells directly to consumers. From Proposition 4 and 5, we found that the retailer's RPP is a more effective strategy to defend supplier's encroachment. This is because it can lock some segment of the market by offering discounts in Period 1. Stated differently, under Model M, the manufacturer is likely to obtain more profitability relative to Model R when 
C. A REVENUE SHARING CONTRACT
In subsections 4.2 and 4.3, our analysis revealed that, although the retailer's response strategy of MB creates better economic performance for both parties relative to Model R (see Propositions 6 and 7), this strategy is not supported by the retailer. This is because it always leaves the retailer worse off (see Proposition 5) . However, it is profitable to the manufacturer (see Proposition 4) . An effective supply chain network requires a cooperative relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer. To encourage both parties to support Model M, consistent with Gérard et al. [53] , Kong et al. [54] , Yan et al. [55] , we proposed that the manufacturer can utilize a revenue-sharing contract as an effective mechanism to achieve a perfect coordination. In this paper, since the manufacturer can get more benefits from model M, we considered that the manufacturer shares part of the profits with the retailer. Under the revenue sharing contract, the manufacturer offers a wholesale price and claims a fraction of revenue from the retailer that it generates. The retailer not only pays the wholesale price per unit purchased, but also shares a percentage of the revenue with the manufacturer. As a result, the profit functions of the channel members in Model M was given as:
where, π S m and π S r are manufacturer's profit and retailer's profit in the revenue sharing scenario respectively. As such, the parameter φ represents the proportion of the manufacturer 's profit that the supply chain players agree to share. The following proposition characterizes the conditions under which the revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the supply chain. Proofs are given in Appendix B. Recall that under Proposition 7, both parties acted independently to maximize their respective profits. Model M is always beneficial to the manufacturer but detrimental to the retailer relative to Model R. Furthermore, we proposed a revenue-sharing contract, which causes the manufacturer to share the revenue generated from each unit with the retailer, but does not change the optimal decisions for both parties. Hence, given a revenue sharing contract, Model M is still beneficial to the manufacturer more than Model R. On the other hand, Proposition 6 indicates that the total supply chain profit in Model M is always higher relative to Model R under certain conditions. This implies that, the manufacturer has a sufficiently higher profitability in Model M (see Proposition 4) that can ''compensate'' for the retailer's profit ''loss'' in Model M (see Proposition 4). We further found that, if the sharing parameter satisfy φ< 2585−3080c 21288−14856c+3248c 2 , the manufacturer's profitability in Model M is still higher than that of Model R. Again, if the sharing parameter satisfy φ > 14408c−181 85152−59424c+12992c 2 , the retailer can share so much revenue from the manufacturer. Under this condition also his/her profitability in Model M is equally higher relative to Model R. That is, the retailer always benefits more from the revenue sharing and would prefer to choose the strategy of MB; as a result, compared to Model R, the revenue sharing contract can achieve an outstanding economic performance for the supply chain activities. Thus, with inference from Proposition 7, we can design a revenue-sharing contract that can create a win-win-win outcome for both parties and the total supply chain continuum.
Proposition 7: When the manufacturer agrees to a revenue-sharing contract with the sharing parameter of
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we mainly analyzed how the value of direct selling cost c affects the optimal equilibrium decisionmaking, and the supply chain economic performance of the two models. To satisfy non-negativity constraints, we only considered 59 212 < c < 117 140 . Thus, we selected c=0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, for facilitating numerical analysis. Table 3 gives the corresponding values of the equilibrium decision-making and supply chain economic performance under different cost data.
As shown in Fig.2 , whenever the direct selling cost c increases from 0.3 to 0.7, in both models, the value of q k * m , w k * 1A , p k * A and d k * increases as well. However, the value of w k * 2A decreases with an increase of the direct selling cost c. The implications behind this trend are as follows: if the direct selling cost is higher, the manufacturer's direct selling business will be weakened. Thus, the manufacturer has an incentive to raise the wholesale price, leading the retailer's price p k * A to increase with an increase in the direct selling cost c. As for d k * , the higher p k * A , the more the retailer is willing to offer more competitive products in terms of price (i.e., greater discount).This causes the value of the discount to increase with an increase in the direct selling cost c. However, the fall in w k * 2A whenever the direct selling cost c increases can be interpreted as follows. First, the higher the retail price, the smaller the wholesale revenue that accrue to the manufacturer. As a result, the manufacturer expects the retailer to cut prices by lowering wholesale prices. Secondly, the manufacturer also expects to avoid a situation where the retailer takes a greater product discounts which will have a huge negative impact on the direct channel.
Moreover, it can be inferred from Figure 3 (a-c) that, as the direct selling cost c increases, the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the total supply chain in both Models decrease owing to the fact that the retailer's price is increasing with the direct selling cost c.
Furthermore, we analyzed the difference between the two models via numerical simulation.
According to Figure 2 , and the above analysis, we have noticed that the trend in the value of q k * m , w k * 1A , w k * 2A , p k * A and d k * in the two models are consistent. However, the values in the two models are different. Specifically, the value of q M * y, w * 2A , w * 1A , p * A and d * in Model M are always higher than that of Model R (see Figure 2 (a-e) ). This is consistent with the theoretical results of the Propositions 1-3. That is, Figure 3 , we found that with the increase in the direct selling cost c, the difference in manufacturer's profit between the two models will narrow. Especially, when the value of the direct selling costc is large enough, there will be no difference. This is because the increase of direct selling cost c will weaken the advantage of the manufacturer in model M. Figure 3(b) and Figure 3 (c) demonstrate that with the increase in the direct selling cost c, the difference in retailer's and total supply chain's profit between the two models will be expanded. This can be explained by the fact that as the direct selling cost c increases, the manufacturer's direct selling business will be weakened, and the retailer's advantage as a result of the discounts will be deepened. In addition, there are differences in profit performance between the two models, like Proposition 4, the manufacturer's profitability in Model M is always higher than that VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Effects of c on changing trend of optimal equilibrium making-decisions of the two models. of Model R. Again, similar to Proposition 5, the retailer's profits in Model M is always lower than that of Model R. Figure 3 (c) demonstrates that, the profits of the total supply chain in Model M is higher than that of Model R when the direct selling cost c does not exceed 0.4. The result is consistent with the prediction from Proposition 5. As a result, the numerical analysis is consistent with our theoretical results.
VI. CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
In recent years, following the development of the Internet and information technology, a growing number of manufacturers have found it attractive to supplement their pre-existing retail channels with an e-channel. A side effect of such supplier encroachment is that, it threatens the profitability of existing retailers and further creates channel conflicts [6] . Although, academic literature spanning from Hahn et al. [20] , has evaluated supplier's encroachment from operations standpoint, it has ignored the flexibility of the retailer to choose different responses in the face of such encroachment. To fill this knowledge gap in research, we developed several models to account for how retailers' MB and RPP strategies in the traditional retail channels affect economic performance of the supply chain given supplier's encroachment.
More specifically, we developed a two-period dual-channel model in which one of the two manufacturers sells a product through a direct channel; given that there is an independent retailer who can bundle two of the manufacturers' products together, and reduce their reservation prices. Using these models, we sought to address the issues for economic performance in a dual-channel supply chain by answering the following questions: From an economic performance standpoint, how do retailers' different responses to strategies from supplier's encroachment affect the profitability of all parties? Which strategy is better for the manufacturer and retailer? Finally, as a Stackelberg leader, is there any effective method for the manufacturer that does not only provide higher profits for himself/herself and total supply chain, but also for the retailer?
We discussed managerial implications of our key results and made suggestions for further research as indicated below.
First, our analysis suggested that the manufacturer should set a higher wholesale price in Model M in order to cope with the retailer's countermeasures -for the avoidance of detrimental effects on his/her direct selling business. The wholesale price as a coordinating lever is widely used in the dual-channel supply chain, especially, in the case of the manufacturer-led. For example, Arya et al. [21] suggested that the manufacturer should set a lower wholesale price in order to increase the retailer's volume of purchase relative to wholesale products. However, in practice, carefully designed wholesale prices can help managers to increase their profit margins in a complex competitive environment. Thus, our results have practical implications for the manufacturer to decide on the appropriate time to adjust the wholesale price in a dual-channel supply chain framework.
Second, from the economic performance of the supply chain, a retailer's MB strategy creates strategic issues that are significantly different from RPP strategic issues. In particular, we found that the manufacturer may benefit more from Model M. But this condition is impossible to the retailer. That is, our result points to the fact that the manufacturer is more inclined to accept the retailer's MB strategy than to have other choices. Although, we found that Model M is always beneficial to the manufacturer more than Model R, the retailer has less incentive to adopt it because (s)he is always worse off with such response strategy. Therefore, our research results have practical implications for the retailer to decide which countermeasures (s)he adopts to response to the supplier's encroachment. In practice, many brand name retailers, including Wal-Mart, BestBuy, and Toys ''R'' Us have adopted MB and RPP in response to external competition such as supplier encroachment. But the impact of these two strategies on the dual-channel supply chain is different. We suggest that retailers should consider not only their own profits, but also the impact on supply chain performance when formulating countermeasures strategies.
Third, we found that under certain conditions, both the manufacturer and the total supply chain can benefit more from Model M. However, this result is not Pareto dominating, implying that the retailer is always worse off with such response strategy. In order for the retailer to gain more revenue and also support Model M, we designed a revenue sharing contract to achieve a ''win-win-win'' result for both parties and the total supply chain. Our results suggested that a manufacturer (as a Stackelberg leader) should not consider competition only, but also the cooperation among the supply chain members. Before offering contracts, manufacturing managers should carefully examine whether contracts that coordinate the dual-channel supply chain can improve the efficiency of the supply chain. Again, the retailers should also alter their countermeasures and agree on the contracts with the manufacturer for a stable supply chain ecosystem.
This research could be extended in the following directions. Firstly, our model assumes that two manufacturers distribute two independent products. In reality, however, they may be complementary or substitutions. Secondly, we assumed that consumers show no preference between the direct channel and the retail channel. However, in the real world, consumers may exhibit differing preferences over different distribution channels. We hope this research will ignite debate, and against this backdrop open other interesting avenues for further research. Finally, given our focus on economic performance issues, we abstracted away other factors, including how the manufacturer may strategically choose MB and RPP for his/her own products.
APPENDIX
PROOFS OF STATEMENTS
All parameters and variables in this paper must satisfy nonnegativity constraints, we should ensure 
A. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS FOR BOTH MODELS 1) ANALYSIS OF ENDOGENOUS MANUFACTURER
In this paper, we assumed that manufacturer B doesn't have direct marketing channels, and the problem of manufacturer B is solved in a single channel. In this endogenous section, the problem of manufacturer B is: max 
2) ANALYSIS OF MODEL M
Since the manufacturer encroaches into the retail market in Period 2, we thus can derive the demand in Period 1 as:
, and q M * m into Eqs. (4) and (5) to get the equilibrium outcomes in Table 1 .
3) ANALYSIS OF MODEL R
In model R, as Fig. 5 and 6 shows, the demand derivation is also consistent with that of RPP in [10] . Note that, in our both models the retailer only offer a coupon for the product A that it may use it in period 2, as a result, in period 1, the demands for the product A and B are
, respectively. While, in Period 2, those consumers who get coupon for product A and may use it in period 2, the demand for them is
. Since the units sold through the direct-channel is q R m , the demand for the product A with a regular price is
. In model R, we firstly solved the retailer's profits of (6) and yielded
, Then substituted the d R * into (7) yielded the manufacture A's problem as max < 0. That is to say, for any c ∈ (c,c), π M r < π R r is always holds.
6) PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 6
To prove π 
